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Abstract. We present a new technique for analyzing platforms that ex-
ecute potentially malicious code, such as web-browsers, mobile phones,
or virtualized infrastructures. Rather than analyzing given code, we ask
what code an intruder could create to break a security goal of the plat-
form. To avoid searching the infinite space of programs that the intruder
could come up with (given some initial knowledge) we adapt the lazy
intruder technique from protocol verification: the code is initially just a
process variable that is getting instantiated in a demand-driven way dur-
ing its execution. We also take into account that by communication, the
malicious code can learn new information that it can use in subsequent
operations, or that we may have several pieces of malicious code that can
exchange information if they “meet”. To formalize both the platform and
the malicious code we use the mobile ambient calculus, since it provides
a small, abstract formalism that models the essence of mobile code. We
provide a decision procedure for security against arbitrary intruder am-
bients when the honest ambients can only perform a bounded number of
steps and without path constraints in communication.
1 Introduction
Mobile Intruder With mobile intruder we summarize the problem of executing
code from an untrusted source in a trusted environment. The most common
example is executing in a web browser code from untrusted websites (e.g., in
Javascript). We trust the web browser and surrounding operating system (at
least in its initial setup), we have a security policy for executing code (e.g.,
the Document Object Model in web-browsers), and we want to verify that an
intruder cannot design any piece of code that would upon execution lead to a
violation of our security policy [10]. There are many similar examples where code
from an untrusted source is executed by an honest host such as mobile phones
or virtual infrastructures.
Related Problems The mobile intruder problem is in a sense the dual of the
mobile agents problem where “honest” code is executed by an untrusted envi-
ronment [3]. The mobile intruder problem has also similarities with the proof-
carrying-code (PCC) paradigm [13]. In PCC we also want to convince ourselves
? The research presented in this paper has been partially supported by MT-LAB, a
VKR Centre of Excellence for the Modelling of Information Technology. The authors
thank Luca Vigano` for helpful discussions and comments.
that a piece of code that comes from an untrusted source will not violate our
policy. In contrast to PCC, we consider here not a concrete given piece of code,
but verify that our environment securely executes every piece of code. Also, of
course, we do not require code to be equipped with a proof of its security.
The Problem and a Solution The difficulty to verify a given architecture for
running potentially malicious code lies in the fact that there is an infinite number
of programs that the intruder can come up with (given some initial knowledge).
Even bounding the size of programs (which is hard to justify in general), the
number of choices is vast, so that naively searching this space of programs is
infeasible.
We observe that this problem is very similar to a problem in protocol ver-
ification and that one may use similar verification methods to address it. The
similar problem in protocol verification is that the intruder can at any point
send arbitrary messages to honest agents. Also here, we have an infinite choice
of messages that the intruder can construct from a given knowledge, leading to
an infinitely branching transition relation of the system to analyze. While in
many cases we can bound the choice to a finite one without restriction [4], the
choice is still prohibitively large for a naive exploration.
In order to deal with this problem of large or infinite search spaces caused by
the “prolific” intruder, a popular technique in model checking security protocols
is a constraint-based approach that we call the lazy intruder [11, 12, 14, 5]. In
a state where the intruder knows the set of messages K, he can send to any
agent any term t that he can craft from this knowledge, written K ` t. To avoid
this naive enumeration of choices, the lazy intruder instead makes a symbolic
transition where we represent the sent message by a variable x and record the
constraint K ` x. During the state exploration, variables may be instantiated
and the constraints must then be checked for satisfiability. The search procedure
thus determines the sent message x in a demand-driven, lazy way.
A basic idea is now that code can be seen as a special case of a message and
that we may use the lazy intruder to lazily generate intruder code for us. There
are of course several differences to the problem of intruder-generated message,
because code has a dynamic aspect. For instance the code can in a sense “learn”
messages when it is communicating with other processes and use the learned
messages in subsequent actions. Another aspect is that we want to consider
mobility of code, i.e., it may move to another location and continue execution
there. We may thus consider that code is bundled with its local data and move
together with it, as it is the case for instance on migration operations in virtual
infrastructures. As a result, when two pieces of intruder-generate code are able to
communicate with each other, then they can exchange all information they have
gathered. An example is that an intruder-generated piece of code is able to enter
a location, gather some secret information there, and return to the intruder’s
home base with this information.
Contribution The key idea of this paper is to use the lazy intruder for the
malicious mobile code problem: in a nutshell, the code initially written by the
intruder is just a variable x and we explore in a demand driven, lazy way what
this code could look like more concretely in order to achieve an attack.
Like in the original lazy intruder technique, we do not limit the choice of
the intruder, but verify the security for the infinite set of programs the intruder
could conceive. Also, like in the lazy intruder for security protocols, this yields
only a semi-decision procedure for insecurity, because there can be an unbounded
number of interactions between intruder and the environment; this is powerful
enough to simulate Turing machines. However bounding the number of steps
that honest ambients can perform, we obtain a decision procedure.
For such a result, we need to use a formalism to model the mobile intruder
code—or several such pieces of code—and the environment where the code is
executed. In this paper we choose the mobile ambient calculus, which is an ex-
tension of common process calculi with a notion of mobility of the processes and
a concept of boundaries around them, the ambients. The reason for this choice
is that we can develop our approach very abstractly and demonstrate how to
deal with each fundamental aspect of mobile code without committing to a
complex formalization of a concrete environment such as a web-browser running
Javascript or the like. In fact, mobile ambients can be regarded as a “minimal”
formalism for mobility. Moreover, it has a well-defined semantics which is nec-
essary to formally prove the correctness of our lazy mobile intruder technique.
We therefore avoid a lot of technical problems that are immaterial to our ideas,
and neither do we tie our approach to one particular application field.
2 The Ground Model
2.1 The Ambient Calculus
We use the ambient calculus as defined by Cardelli and Gordon [7]. There is a
basic version and an extension with communication primitives; we present the
ambient calculus right away with communication and only mention that our
method also works, mutatis mutandis, for the basic ambient calculus. Fig. 1
contains the syntax of the ambient calculus, and Fig. 2 and 3 give the semantics
by defining a structural congruence and reduction relation, respectively. In these
figures, we have already omitted some primitives that we do not consider in this
paper, namely replication, name restriction, and path constraints; we discuss
these restrictions in Sec. 2.5.
The ambient calculus is an extension of standard process calculi with the
usual constructs 0 for the inactive process, P | Q for the parallel execution
of processes P and Q, as well as input (x).P—binding the variable x in P—
and output 〈M〉. In addition we have a concept of a process running within a
boundary, denoted n[P ], and this boundary has a name n. For instance one may
model by m[Pv1[R] | vn[Q]] a situation where a process is running on a physical
machine m together with virtual machines v1 and v2 on which processes R and
Q are running, respectively. The communication rule (4) for instance says that
processes can only communicate when they run in parallel, but not when they
P,Q ::= processes M ::= capabilities
0 inactivity x variable
P | Q composition n name
M [P ] ambient in M can enter M
M.P capability action out M can exit M
(x).P input action open M can open M
〈M〉 output action
Fig. 1. Considered fragment of the ambient calculus.
P ≡ P
P ≡ Q
Q ≡ P
P ≡ Q Q ≡ R
P ≡ R
P ≡ Q
P | R ≡ Q | R
P ≡ Q
M [P ] ≡M [Q]
P ≡ Q
M.P ≡M.Q
P ≡ Q
(x).P ≡ (x).Q P | Q ≡ Q | P
(P | Q) | R ≡ P | (Q | R) P | 0 ≡ P
Fig. 2. Structural congruence relation.
are separated by ambient boundaries. Process can move with the operations
in n and out n according to rules (1) and (2); also one process can remove the
boundary n[·] of another parallel running ambient by the action open n according
to rule (3). In all positions where names can be used, we may also use arbitrary
capabilities M , e.g., one may have strange ambient names like in in n, but this
is merely because we do not enforce any typing on the communication rules, and
we will not consider this in examples.
We require that in all ambients where two input actions (x).P and (y).P
occur, different variable symbols x 6= y are used. This is not a restriction since
we do not have the replication operator and can therefore make all variables
disjoint initially by α-renaming.
2.2 Transition Relation
The definition of the reduction relation → in Fig. 3 is standard, however there
is a subtlety we want to point out that is significant later when we go to a
symbolic relation ⇒. The point is that to be completely precise, the symbols n,
m, P , Q, R, P ′, and Q′ in these rules are meta-variables ranging over names
and ambients, respectively. When applying a rule, these variables are supposed
to be matched with the ambient they are applied to.
To work with the symbolic approach later more easily, let us reformulate this
and make explicit the matching by interpreting rules as rewriting rules. In this
view, the rules (1)–(4) of Fig. 3 define the essential behavior of the in, out, and
n[in m.P | Q] | m[R] → m[n[P | Q] | R] (1)
m[n[out m.P | Q] | R] → n[P | Q] | m[R] (2)
open n.P | n[Q] → P | Q (3)
(x).P | 〈M〉 → P{x 7→M} (4)
P ′ ≡ P P → Q Q ≡ Q′
P ′ → Q′
P → Q
n[P ]→ n[Q]
P → Q
P | R→ P | Q
Fig. 3. Reduction relation of the ambient calculus
open operators and communication, while the other rules simply tell us to which
subterms of an ambient the rules may be applied. For instance, the ambient M.P
does not admit a reduction, even if the subterm P does. We can capture that
by an evaluation context defined as follows:
C[·] ::= context
· empty context
C[·] | P parallel context
M [C[·]] ambient context
We define that each rule r = L→ R of the first four rules of Fig. 3 (where the
ambients L and R have free (meta-) variables on the left-hand and right-hand
side) induces a transition relation on closed ambients as follows: S →r S′ holds
iff there is an evaluation context C[·] and a substitution σ for all the variables
of r such that S ≡ C[σ(P )] and S′ := C[σ(R)].1
2.3 Ground Intruder Theory
We now define how the intruder can construct ambients from a given knowledge
K, which is simply a set of ground capabilities (i.e. without variables). This
model is defined in the style of Dolev-Yao models of protocol verification as the
least closure of K under the application of some operators. These operators are
encryption and the like for protocol verification, and here they are the following
constructors of ambients (written with their arguments for readability):
Σp = {0 , P | Q , M [P ] , M.P , 〈M〉 , in M , out M , open M}
We here leave out the input (x).P because it is treated by a special rule.
Fig. 4 inductively defines the ground intruder deduction relation K `V T
where K is a set of ground capabilities, T ranges over capabilities and processes,
and V is a set of variables such that V = fv(T ) the free variables of T . We
require that the knowledge K of the intruder contains at least one name ni, so
1 One may additionally allow here that S′ can be rewritten modulo ≡ to match the
rules of Fig. 3 precisely, but it is not necessary because when applying further tran-
sition rules, this is done modulo ≡.
K `M M ∈ K (Axiom)
K ` P P ≡ Q
K ` Q (Str.Cong.)
K `V1 T1 . . . K `Vn Tn
K `∪ni=1Vi f(T1, . . . , Tn)
f ∈ Σp (Public Operation)
K `{x} x x ∈ V (Use variables)
K `V P
K `V \{x} (x).P
(Input)
Fig. 4. Ground intruder deduction rules.
the intruder can always say something. For V = ∅ we also write simply K ` T .
Let V denote the set of all variable symbols. The (Axiom) and (Str.Cong.) express
that the derivable terms contain all elements of the knowledge K and are closed
under structural congruence. The (Public Operation) rule says that derivability
is closed under all the operators from Σp; here the free variables of the resulting
term are the union of the free variables of the subterms. The rule (Use variables)
and (Input) together allow the intruder to generate processes that read an input
and then use it.
As an example, given intruder knowledge K = {in n,m} we can derive for
instance K ` m[(x).in n.out x.〈open m〉].
We use the common term “ground intruder” and later “ground transition
system” from protocol verification, suggesting we work with terms that contain
no variables. We allow the intruder however to create processes like (x).P where
P may freely contain x, and only require that the intruder processes at the end
of the day are closed terms (without free variables). We may thus correctly call
it “closed intruder” and “closed transition system” but we prefer to stick with
the established terms.
2.4 Security Questions
We are now interested in security questions of the following form: given an honest
ambient and a position within that ambient where the intruder can insert some
arbitrary code that he can craft from his knowledge, can he break a security goal
of the honest ambient? This is made precise by the following definition:
Definition 1. Let us specify security goals via a predicate attack(P ) that holds
true for an ambient P when we consider P to be successfully attacked. We then
also call P an attack state. Let C[·] be an (evaluation) context without free
variables that represents the honest ambients and the position where the intruder
can insert code. Let finally K0 be a set of ground capabilities. Then the question
we want to answer is whether there exist P0 and P such that K0 ` P0, C[P0]→∗
P and attack(P ).
We generalize this form of security questions as expected to the case where
the intruder can insert several pieces of code P0, . . . , Pk in different locations,
and they are generated from different knowledges K0, . . . ,Kk, respectively.
There are many ways to define security goals for ambients, and we have opted
here for state-based safety properties rather than observational equivalences. In
fact, the most simple goal is that no intruder ambient may ever learn a secret
name s. On the ground level, there is a technical difficulty to define attack(P )
for secrecy of s, because one needs to keep track of what the intruder code has
learned. (For instance one can require the intruder to produce a term of the form
C[s] for some context C[·] that is never produced by an honest ambient.) On the
symbolic level we define below, the knowledge of intruder processes is obvious
in the notation, so that secrecy goals are straightforward to specify then.
Another goal is that the intruder code cannot reach a given position in the
ambient. This can be reduced to a secrecy goal—at the destination waits a
process that writes out a secret. A more complex goal is containment: a sandbox
may host an intruder code and give that code some secret s to compute with,
but the intruder code should not be able to get s out of the sandbox. This can
again be reduced to secrecy (of another value s′) if outside the sandbox a special
ambient s[open ni.〈s′〉] is waiting. From this ambient an intruder process (who
initially knows the name ni) can obtain secret s
′ if it was able to learn s and get
out of the sandbox.
Example 1. As an example let us consider the firewall example from [7]:
Firewall ≡ w[k[out w.in k′.in w] | open k′.open k′′.〈s〉]
The goal is that the firewall can only be entered by an ambient that knows
the three passwords k, k′, and k′′ (in fact having capability open k instead of
k is sufficient). Here the ambient k[·] acts as a pilot that can move out of the
firewall, fetch a client ambient (that needs authenticate itself) and move it into
the firewall. Suppose we run Firewall | P for some ambient P that the intruder
generated from knowledge K and define as an attack, if the intruder ambient
learns secret s. If K includes open k, k′, k′′, then we have an attack, since the
intruder can generate the ambient P ≡ k′[open k.k′′[(x).P0]] from K. An attack
is reached as follows:
Firewall | P
→ w[open k′.open k′′.〈s〉] | k[in k′.in w] | P
→ w[open k′.open k′′.〈s〉] | k′[k[in w] | open k.k′′[(x).P0]]
→ w[open k′.open k′′.〈s〉] | k′[in w | k′′[(x).P0]]
→ w[open k′.open k′′.〈s〉 | k′[k′′[(x).P0]]]
→ w[〈s〉 | (x).P0]
→ w[P0[x 7→ s]]
If the knowledge K from which the intruder ambient is created does not include
open k (or k), k′ and k′′, then no attack is possible. Also if we rather define the
attack to get the secret s out of the firewall again, the attacker cannot do it unless
he knows w (which is a secret of the firewall), as an example for containment.
2.5 The Considered Fragment
For the automation, we have made some restrictions w.r.t. the original ambient
calculus. The replication operator !P ≡ P | !P together with the creation of
new names allows for simulating arbitrary Turing machines and thus prevents a
decision procedure for security. Similar to the lazy intruder in protocol verifica-
tion, we thus bound the steps that honest ambients can perform and do this by
simply disallowing the replication operator for honest ambients. Without repli-
cation, one of the main reasons for the name restriction operator νn.P is gone,
since we can α-rename all restricted names so that they are unique throughout
the ambients. Note that the name restriction is also useful for goals of observa-
tional equivalence, which are essential for privacy goals [1, 2] but which we do
not consider in this paper.
Note that we do not bound the size of ambients that the intruder creates: the
derivation relation K ` P allows him to make arbitrary use of all constructors.
It may appear as if the intruder were bounded because K ` P does not include
the replication operator either, but this is not true: an attack always consists of
a finite number of steps (as violation of a safety property) and thus every attack
that can be achieved by an intruder ambient with replication can be achieved by
one without replication (just by “unrolling” the replication as much as necessary
for the particular attack). The difference between unbounded intruder ambients
and bounded honest ambients thus stems from the fact that we ask questions
of the form: “can a concrete honest ambient (of fixed size) be attacked by any
dishonest ambient (of arbitrary size)?”
We do not need give the intruder the ability to create arbitrary new names.
The reason is that we have no inequality checks in the ambient calculus, i.e.,
no ambient can check upon receiving a capability n that it is different from all
names it knows (e.g. to prevent replays). Thus, whatever attack works when the
intruder uses different self-created names works similarly with always using the
same intruder name ni that we give the intruder initially.
Finally, the extension of ambients with communication includes so-called
path constraints of the form M.M ′ that can be communicated as messages.
Note that this is not ordinary concatenation of messages (which the symbolic
techniques we use can easily handle) but sequences of instructions and only after
the first has been successfully executed, the next one becomes available, and so
the paths cannot be decomposed. Since this includes several problems that would
complicate our method, we have excluded them.
3 Symbolic Ambients
We now introduce the symbolic, constraint-based approach that is at the core
of this paper. To efficiently answer the kind of security questions we formalized
in the previous paragraph, we want to avoid search the space of all ambients
that an intruder can come up with. To that end, we use the basic idea of the
symbolic, constraint-based approach of protocol verification, also known as the
lazy intruder [11, 12, 14, 5].
When an agent in a protocol wants to receive a message of the form t—a
term that contains variables—we avoid enumerating the set of all messages that
the intruder can generate and that are instances of t (because this set is often
very large or infinite). Rather we remember the constraint K ` t where K is
the set of messages that the intruder knows at the point when he sends the
instance of t. We then proceed with states that have free variables, namely the
variables of t (and of other messages as they sent and received). The allowed
values for these variables is governed by the constraints. For a fixed number
of agents and sessions, this gives us a symbolic finite-state transition system.
What remains to obtain a decision procedure (given a characterization of attack
states) is a decision procedure for satisfiability of the constraints attached to each
state. The complexity of this decision procedure has been studied for a variety of
algebraic theories of the operators involved, e.g. [8, 9]; in the easiest theory, the
free algebra, the problem is NP-complete [14]. Since one can check satisfiability of
the constraints on-the-fly (and prune the search tree once a state has unsatisfiable
constraints), messages during the search get successively instantiated with more
concrete messages—following what the transitions require in a demand-driven,
lazy way. Hence the name.
Now we carry over this idea to ambients and apply it to the ambients that
were written by the intruder, i.e. lazily creating the intruder-generated ambients
during the search. Recall that in the previous section we defined security prob-
lems as reachability of an attack state from C[P0] where C[·] is a given honest
agent and K0 ` P0 is any intruder process generated from a given initial knowl-
edge K0. We thus could thus simply work with a symbolic state C[P0] where
P0 is a variable and we have the constraint K0 ` P0. We then have to define
appropriate transition rules for these symbolic ambients.
One inconvenience attached to using a variable to represent a process is
that with every step the process changes and we need to then introduce new
variables and relate them to the old ones. Moreover the processes can learn new
information by communication with others, so the available knowledge changes.
For these two reasons we follow the most convenient option and simply represent
an intruder generated process by K where K is the knowledge from which it
was created. Here K is a set of capabilities and intuitively K represents any
process that can be created from K. If an ambient contains two occurrences
of K for the same K, they may represent different processes. K may contain
variables because we will also handle the communication between ambients with
the lazy intruder technique. We thus extend the syntax of ambients P,Q of
Fig. 1 by K , and we consider symbolic security problems as reachability of a
symbolic attack state (defined below) from an initial state C[ K ] where C[·] is
an honest ambient environment that the intruder code is running in.
A symbolic processes will also be equipped with constraints which have the
following syntax:
φ, ψ ::= constraints
K `M intruder deduction constraint
x = M substitution
φ ∧ ψ conjunction
Intuitively, K ` M means that capability/message M can been generated by
the intruder from knowledge K. In fact, we do not need K ` P for processes
P in the symbolic constraints, due to the K notation and since we have no
construct for sending processes.
Semantics We define the semantics for pairs (S, φ) of symbolic ambients and
constraints as a (usually infinite) set of closed processes. An interpretation I is a
mapping from all variables to ground capabilities. We extend this to a morphism
on capabilities, processes, and sets of processes as expected; where I substitutes
only free occurences of variables. We define the model relation as follows:
I |= K `M iff I(K) ` I(M)
I |= x = M iff I(x) = I(M)
I |= φ ∧ ψ iff I |= φ and I |= ψ
The semantics of (S, φ) is the set of possible instantiation of all variables and
intruder code pieces K with closed processes:
[[P, φ]] = {Q | I |= φ ∧Q ∈ ext(I(P ))}
ext( K ) = {P | K ` P}
ext(x) = {x}
ext(n) = {n}
ext(f(T1, . . . , Tn)) = {f(T ′1, . . . , T ′n) | T ′1 ∈ ext(T1) ∧ . . . ∧ T ′n ∈ ext(Tn)}
Here the Ti range over capabilities and processes and f ranges over all construc-
tors of capabilities and processes. Note the case ext(x) can only occur when
processing a subterm of an ambient where x is bound, so no free variables occur
in any S0 ∈ [[P, φ]].
Symbolic Attack States Since each intruder process K keeps track of its
knowledge (it is extended when the intruder processes comunicates with another
process and learns a capability), we can formalize secrecy of a name s easily on
the symbolic level: attack(S, φ) shall hold if S contains an intruder process K
such that φ ∧K ` s is satifiable.
Lazy Intruder Constraint Reduction A decision procedure for satisfiability
of K ` M constraints can be designed straightforwardly in the style of [12, 5],
since we just need to handle the constructors for capabilities, namely in, out,
and open, and we have no destructors (or algebraic properties). Note that these
approaches require a well-formedness conditions on the constraints, namely that
variables originate only from an intruder choice and that the intruder knowledge
grows monotonically. We need a small adaption for our setting, because in general
we have several intruder processes with incomparable knowledge; however the
knowledge in each of these processes grows monotonically. Thus, we define well-
formedness by the existence of a partial order (instead of a total order) along
which the intruder knowledge grows monotonically and along which variables
first occur on the right-hand side of a constraint.
3.1 Symbolic Transition Rules
We now define a symbolic transition relation on symbolic processes with con-
straints of the form (S, φ)⇒ (S′, φ∧ψ). Note that the constraints are augmented
in every step, i.e., all previous constraints φ remain and new constraints ψ may
be added.
We first want to lift the standard transition rules on ground ambients of
Section 2.2 to the symbolic level. The idea is to replace the rule matching defined
above with rule unification. Recall that before, we have essentially defined a
transition rule r = L → R to be applicable to state S if S = C[σ(L)] for some
substitution σ and evaluation context C[·]. For the symbolic level we have that S
may contain free variables that need to be substituted as well. Suppose the rule
r does not contain any variables that occur in the symbolic state (S, φ) (which is
achieved by α-renaming the rule variables). Thus define that (S, φ)⇒r (S′, φ∧ψ)
holds iff there is an evaluation context C[·] and a term T such that:
– S ≡ C[T ];
– σ is a most general unifier of T and L modulo ≡, i.e., σ(T ) ≡ σ(L) and for
no generalization τ of σ it holds that τ(T ) ≡ τ(L); and
– S′ = σ(C[σ(R)]) and ψ = eq(σ).
Observe σ may now replace also variables that occur in S and thus σ is applied
also to C[·].
Example 2. Using the in rule, we can now make the following symbolic transi-
tion: (x[P ] | y[in z.Q], φ)⇒ (z[P | y[Q]], φ ∧ x = z)
Similarly, also (x[P ] | y[in z. K ], φ)⇒ (z[P | y[ K ]], φ∧x = z) is possible
for an intruder generated piece of code K .
So far, however, the rules do not allow us to make an in transition on the
following state: (x[P ] | y[ K ], φ) even if the intruder can generate a process of
the form in z.Q from knowledge K. We will see below how to add appropriate
rules for intruder-generated ambients, so that for instance in the above state an
in-rule is applicable.
It is thus clear that the described symbolic transitions are sound (i.e., all
states that are reachable in the symbolic model represent states that are reach-
able in the standard ground model) but not yet complete. More precisely, in
the condition S ≡ C[T ] above we restrict the application of rule r to contexts
that exist in S—without first instantiating intruder code like K first. To give
a complete set of rules for intruder ambients is the subject of the rest of this
section.
Intruder-written Code We now come to the very core of the approach: lazily
instantiating a piece of code K that the intruder generated from knowledge
K, with a more concrete term in a demand-driven way. It is basically what is
lacking after the lifting of the ground rules that we have just described, namely
when an “abstract” piece of intruder-written code K prevents the application
of a rule that would be applicable when replacing K with some more concrete
process P for which K ` P . Obviously we would like to identify such situations
without enumerating all processes P that can be generated from K.
In the example x[P ] | y[ K ] we discussed above, we have the following
possibility: if the intruder code marked K were to have the shape in x.Q, we
could apply the in rule and get to the state x[y[ K ] | P ], assuming K ` in x.
Note the residual code (inside y[·] after the move) is again something generated
from knowledge K.
There is a systematic way to obtain all rules that are necessary to achieve
completeness, namely by answering the following question: given a symbolic
ambient with constraints (S, φ), any ground ambient S0 ∈ [[S, φ]], and a transition
S0 → S′0 what rule do we need on the symbolic level to perform an analogous
transition? Thus, we want to reach an (S′, φ ∧ ψ) (in zero or more steps) such
that S′0 ∈ [[(S′, φ ∧ ψ)]]. Of course, the rule should also be sound (i.e. all S′0 ∈
[[(S′, φ∧ψ)]] are reachable with ground transition rules from some S0 ∈ [[(S, φ)]]).
Soundness is relatively easy to see, because we need to consider rules only in
isolation. We now systematically derive rules for each case of (S, φ), S0, and
S′0 that can occur and thereby achieve a sound and complete set of symbolic
transition rules.
Recall that by the definition, for a transition from S0 to S
′
0 with rule r =
L→ R, we need to have an evaluation context C0[·] and a substitution σ of the
rule variables such that S0 = C[σ(L)] and S1 = C[σ(R)].
The symbolic transition rules we have defined above already handle the case
that the symbolic state S has the form S = C ′[T ] where σ(C ′)[·] = C[·] and
σ(L) ≡ σ(T ) (as shown in the examples previously) where at a corresponding
position a similar rule (under renaming) can be applied without instantiating
intruder code. This includes the case that a rule variable P of type ambient is
unified with a piece K of intruder code.
Another case that does not require further work is when the rule match in
S0 is for a subterm of intruder-generated code, i.e. where we have K in the
symbolic term S. Here we use the fact that intruder deduction is closed under
evaluation: if K ` P and P → P ′, then also K ` P ′.
Therefore all remaining cases that we need to handle are where one or more
proper subterms of the redex σ(L) in S0 are intruder-written code that are not
trivial, i.e. represent a variable in L. We make a case-split
– by the different transition rules for →, namely (1)–(4),
– and by how S relates to matching subterm of the transition rule in S0.
In-Rule Let us mark three positions in the in rule which could be intruder-
written code and that are not yet handled:
p1︷ ︸︸ ︷
n[in m.P︸ ︷︷ ︸
p2
| Q] | m[R]︸ ︷︷ ︸
p3
→ m[n[P | Q] | R]
In fact, this notation contains a simplification: for instance looking at po-
sition p2, we could also have the variant that the intruder code is of the form
in m.P | P ′. In such a case, the intruder code piece K in the symbolic state
would not exactly correspond to a subterm of the matched rule, but only after
“splitting” K into K | K . Such a splitting rule would obviously be sound,
but we do not want to include it, and rather perform such splits only in a demand
driven way (as the following cases show)—and to keep the notation simple for
the positions in the rules. So all positions indicated here are considered under
the possibility that the intruder code itself is a parallel composition; note also
we are matching/unifying modulo ≈.
In rule with intruder code at position p1 The first case we consider is when only
the p1 rule is intruder code, i.e., we have some intruder code running in parallel
with an ambient m[R]; then the intruder code may be able to enter m if it has
the capability in m. As said before, we could have the case that the intruder code
first splits into two parts and only one part enters m while the other part stays
outside. This can be helpful if the intruder code does not have the capability
out m. Since the intruder code can always be trivially 0 if there is nothing to
do, it is not a restriction to make the split, so we avoid two rules. We obtain:
K | m[R]⇒ K | m[x[ K ] | R] and ψ = K ` in m ∧K ` x (5)
Here we denote with ψ the new constraints that should be added to the symbolic
successor state. x is a new variable symbol (that does not occur so far). The
reason for introducing this new symbol x is that a process cannot move without
being surrounded by an ambient n[·] construct; as the n[·] of the normal in rule
has now become part of the K code, we need to say that the intruder himself
created the ambient. As there is no obligation to pick a particular name for
that ambient, we simply leave it open and just require it is one the intruder can
construct from knowledge K. Note that would be unsound in general to simplify
the right-hand side to m[ K | R] because the intruder cannot get rid of the
surrounding x[·] (even though self-chosen) without another process performing
open x.
To see the soundness of this rule, consider that the intruder code matched
on the left-hand side of the rule should have the form P | x[in m.Q] for some
processes P and Q generated from knowledge K. These are then represented by
the two K pieces on the right-hand side of the rule.
In rule with intruder code at position p2 Here, intruder code is running inside
ambient n that runs in parallel with ambient m. The intruder code can move
ambient n into m, if it has the capability in m:
n[ K | Q] | m[R]⇒ m[n[ K | Q] | R] and ψ = K ` in m (6)
Note that we could have again the situation that the intruder code is a parallel
composition, i.e. of the form in m.P1 | P2. However, then after the move we still
have P1 | P2 and we thus do not make the split explicit, because this case is still
subsumed by K on the right-hand side.
In rule with intruder code at position p3 Now we consider the situation that an
honest ambient n[in m.P | Q] that wants to enter ambient m runs in parallel
with intruder code. If the intruder code has name m, it can provide the ambient
that the honest process can then enter:
n[in m.P | Q] | K ⇒ m[n[P | Q] | K ] | K and ψ = K ` m (7)
Here we have again an explicit split of the intruder process into two parts. This is
because the concrete intruder process that is partially matched by the left-hand
side may have the form m[R1] | R2, i.e. not entirely running within m, and we
thus need to denote that residual process explicitly on the right-hand side.
In rule with intruder code at several positions If the intruder code is at several
positions of the rule, we get the following situations. Obviously we do not need
to consider the combination (p1) + (p2) because (p2) is a subposition of (p1).
The case (p1) + (p3) means that we have two intruder processes (in general with
different knowledge) to run in parallel: K | K ′ . We will show below (when
we treat communication) that what they can achieve together is to pool their
knowledge and join to one process K ∪K ′ .
What is left is the combination (p2) + (p3) which means that one intruder
process runs inside an ambient n and that runs in parallel with another intruder
process. This case we can express by the following rule:
n[ K | Q] | K ′ ⇒ x[n[ K | Q] | K ′ ] | K ′ and ψ = K ` in x ∧K ′ ` x
Note that the two processes that we start with may not have the same knowledge
(here K and K ′). Again, we have an explicit split on the side of the K ′-generated
process into a part that is entered by n[·] and one that remains outside. Also,
again, this rule has a new variable for any ambient name x that can be entered;
this name needs to be part of K ′ while K only needs to have the in x capability.
The rule in this form is an obstacle for termination of our approach. Observe
that the left-hand side ambient n[·] occurs identically as a subterm on the right
side; so the rule “packs in” the n[·] ambient into another x[·] ambient. While for
other rules we can limit the repeated application (as in the termination proof
below) it is here easier to avoid the arbitrary packing. To achieve this without
loosing completeness, observe that the additional x[·] layer is only relevant if
some honest process comes into contact that wants to perform an in x, out x, or
open x. SinceK ′ ` x these cases can be handled by other symbolic rules. The case
of out can only occur if it is part of the honest process Q i.e., Q = (out x.R) | R′
and the outer process K ′ has x. The resulting rule for this special case is much
easier to handle:
n[ K | (out x.R) | R′] | K ′ ⇒ n[ K | R | R′] | K ′ (8)
and ψ = K ` in x ∧K ′ ` x
Out Rule For the out rule we have two positions of intruder code to consider:
m[
p1︷ ︸︸ ︷
n[out m.P︸ ︷︷ ︸
p2
| Q] | R]→ n[P | Q] | m[R]
Out Rule with intruder code at position p1 Here we have the situation that the
intruder code is within an ambient m and has the capability out m. To move
parts of the code, the intruder must put it within some ambient x (where x is
again a new variable symbol):
m[ K | R]⇒ x[ K ] | m[ K | R] and ψ = K ` out m ∧K ` x (9)
Out rule with intruder code at p2 This situation is similar except that the in-
truder code is already contained within an ambient n. We then have:
m[n[ K | Q] | R]⇒ n[ K | Q] | m[R] and ψ = K ` out m (10)
This subsumes also the case that there is intruder code at both in m and in n
(i.e. also within what is matched as R here).
Open-Rule The open rule has also just two positions for intruder code, the
opening code and the opened code:
open n.P︸ ︷︷ ︸
p1
| n[Q]︸︷︷︸
p2
→ P | Q
The rules for the intruder code at p1 and at p2, respectively are immediate:
K | n[Q]⇒ K | Q and ψ = K ` open n (11)
open n.P | K ⇒ P | K and ψ = K ` n (12)
The case (p1) + (p2) is again the case of two parallel communicating processes
that is treated next.
Communication Rule Again there are two possible positions where intruder
code could reside, namely as the sender or as the receiver:
(x).P︸ ︷︷ ︸
p1
| 〈M〉︸︷︷︸
p2
→ P [x 7→M ]
Communication with the intruder receiving The intruder can receive a message
M from an honest process running in parallel:
K | 〈M〉 ⇒ K ∪ {M} (13)
Here the resulting intruder process has the message M simply added to its
knowledge. The idea is that the remaining process can behave like any process
that the intruder could have created, if he initially knew K ∪ {M}. To see that
this is sound, consider that the intruder process would have the form (x).P for
a new variable x that can occur arbitrarily in P . Thus if this process reads M ,
the resulting P [x 7→ M ] is is a process that can be generated from knowledge
K ∪ {M} if P was created from knowledge K.
Communication with the intruder sending For the case that intruder code sends
out a message that is received by an honest ambient, we can be truly lazy :
(x).P | K ⇒ P | K and ψ = K ` x (14)
Here, we do not instantiate the message x that is being received, we simply
add the constraint that x must be something the intruder can generate from
knowledge K. This is in fact the classic case of the lazy intruder—postponing
the choice of a concrete message that one sends to an agent. Since the intruder
knowledge contains at least one name, there is always “something to say”, but
what it is will only be determined if the variable x gets unified later on for
applying some rule (which can render the K ` x constraint unsatisfiable).
Communication with the intruder both sending and receiving Finally we have
the rule that was mentioned above already: when two intruder processes meet
they can exchange their knowledge and work together further on:
K | K ′ ⇒ K ∪K ′ (15)
This is sound because every k ∈ K \ K ′ can be sent from the first to the
second process until we have K | K ∪K ′ and then the second part sub-
sumes the first, so we can simplify it to K ∪K ′ . Observe that this rule can
also be used when we restrict ourselves to the pure ambient calculus without
communication: we then simply have two processes in parallel with capabilities
K and K ′, respectively, and what they can achieve is anything a process with
capabilities K ∪K ′ can achieve (even without communication).
We have systematically developed rules for the symbolic transition system, so
that every possible transition → of the original (ground) transition is captured
by some symbolic transition ⇒ and all given rules are sound, thus we have:
Theorem 1. Given a symbolic ambient and constraint (S, φ) then
– any symbolic successor state represents only ground states that are indeed
reachable from [[S, φ]] (soundness): {S′0 | ∃S′, ψ.(S, φ) ⇒ (S′, φ ∧ ψ) ∧ S′0 ∈
[[(S′, φ ∧ ψ)]]} ⊆ {S′0 | ∃S0 ∈ [[S, φ]] ∧ S0 →∗ S′0}
– any successor of a ground state from [[S, φ]] is indeed covered by a reachable
symbolic state (completeness): {S′0 | ∃S′, ψ.(S, φ) ⇒∗ (S′, φ ∧ ψ) ∧ S′0 ∈
[[(S′, φ ∧ ψ)]]} ⊇ {S′0 | ∃S0 ∈ [[S, φ]] ∧ S0 → S′0}
Together with the following theorem, we achieve a terminating a correct
search procedure for the reachability of an attack state:
Theorem 2. The symbolic transition relation is finitely branching and in an
infinite run (S0, φ0) ⇒ (S1, φ1) ⇒ . . . we can effectively recognize an n after
which all (Si, φi) are semantically equal to some previous state (Sj , φj).
Proof. We partition the reduction rules into three categories.
Category Consume Rule These rules are characterized by “consuming” part of
an honest process and therefore cannot be applied ad infinitum; this category
consists of the standard rules (1)–(4) as well as (7),(8), (11), (12), (13), (14).
Category Fixedpoint Rule These rules are characterized by the intruder process
“spreading” into another location without “giving up” its current position. These
are the rules (5) and (9). When two intruder processes meet by these fixedpoint
rules, they can share their knowledge. We can give a finite upper-bound for the
intruder knowledge—all names and all capabilities that can ever be communi-
cated by honest processes. Also the number of locations (that are not created by
the intruder himself) is bounded. Therefore there is a fixedpoint for what these
rules can allow the intruder to reach. Note that the introduction of variables x
in the rules (5) and (9) means that the intruder chooses some name from his
knowledge and he can in principle do that again and again (with a new vari-
able), producing terms of the form x1[ K ] | x2[ K ] | . . .. These can actually
all merge to x1[ K ] since K ` x1 ∧ K ` x2 ∧ . . .. This is not a restriction,
because if any of the xi ever gets instantiated to a concrete name (which must
still be contained in K), we can just reproduce again a generic x2[ K ] from it
using rule (9). Thus, it is not a restriction to apply rules (5) and (9) if there is
not yet a generic x[ K ] at the destination of the move with the same or greater
knowledge. (Here generic means that K ` x and x is not further constrained.)
Category Loop Rule The last category are rules that potentially allow for loops.
This category comprises (6) and (10). For instance n[ {in m, out m} ] | m[P ]⇔
m[n[ {in m, out m} ] | P ] gives rise to an infinite loop without consuming honest
processes or reaching a fixedpoint. However the rules (6) and (10) do not change
the size of the ambient but just let an ambient move. Thus, they eventually
produce no new states in the search.
Suppose now that we have an infinite run without state repetition, then only
in an finite initial portion of the run, we can have applications of consume and
fixedpoint rules, so we need an infinite application of the looping rules without
state repetition which is absurd. uunionsq
3.2 Examples
Let us reconsider the firewall example from before, and see how a lazy intruder
ambient would find the attack. In contrast to the original specification, we leave
open how the intruder ambient P exactly works, and rather specify that it is
some process generated from the initial knowledge K = {in k, k′, k′′}:
(Firewall | K , true)
⇒ (w[open k′.open k′′.〈s〉] | k[in k′.in w] | K , true) by rule (2)
⇒ (w[open k′.open k′′.〈s〉] | k′[k[in w] | K ] | K ,φ1) by rule (7)
⇒ (w[open k′.open k′′.〈s〉] | k′[in w | K ] | K ,φ2) by rule (11)
⇒ (w[open k′.open k′′.〈s〉 | k′[ K ]] | K ,φ2) by rule (1)
⇒ (w[open k′′.〈s〉 | K ] | K ,φ2) by rule (3)
⇒ (w[〈s〉 | K ] | K ,φ3) by rule (12)
⇒ (w[ K ∪ {s} ] | K ,φ3) by rule (13)
where we have collected the constraints φ1 = K ` k′, φ2 = φ1 ∧ K ` open w,
and φ3 = φ2 ∧K ` k′′. These constraints are obviously satisfiable iff K includes
open k (or k), k′, and k′′. This corresponds to the attack we had described
on the ground model, only here we found it lazily during the search, rather
than specifying the process up front. Actually, one needs to reverse engineer the
intruder’s recipe from the attack trace. What is even more obvious to see than
in the ground case is the point where the malicious ambient learns the secret s.
Another difference to the original trace is that we have an intruder process
K remaining at the top-level the entire time. This is basically reflecting the
fact that the intruder process could be a parallel composition of two parts only
one of which enters the firewall—the position outside the does not have to be
“given up” by the intruder.
In the case that learning the secret s alone is not the goal, but to get it
out of the firewall. Indeed we can apply rule (11) to the last reached state to
get ( K ∪ {s} | K ,K ` open w ∧ φ3). (Further, using the (15) rule, the two
intruder processes can merge again, yielding K ∪ {s} .) The new constraint
K ` open w however is not satisfiable, so this symbolic state has an empty
semantics (no attack is realizable in this way) and can be discarded from the
search. In fact, there is no reachable symbolic state with satisfiable constraints
where the secret s is in an intruder process that is not below w[·].
Ambient in the Middle The previous example has basically identified how an
honest client (authenticating itself by the knowledge of the keys k, k′, and k′′) is
supposed to behave, namely Client ≡ k′[open k.k′′[〈s〉]] where s is again a name
that should be secret from the intruder. We now consider the case that such an
honest client and firewall execute in the presence of an intruder ambient K:
(Firewall | Client | K , true)
⇒ (Firewall | k′[open k.k′′[〈s〉] | K ] | x[ K ], φ1)
⇒2 (w[open k′.open k′′.〈s〉] | k′[in w | k′′[〈s〉] | x[ K ]] | K ,φ1)
⇒ (w[open k′.open k′′.〈s〉 | k′[k′′[〈s〉] | x[ K ]]] | | | K ,φ1)
⇒ (w[〈s〉 | k′′[〈s〉] | K ] | K ,φ2)
where φ1 = K ` in k′ ∧K ` x and φ2 = φ1 ∧K ` x = k′′. Thus, the intruder
can inject code into the firewall (that is not bounded by x[·] and can obtain s)
if he knows only in k′ and k′′. The open k capability is not needed, since this is
done by the client after the intruder has infected it.
Communication Example As an example where capabilities are communicated
consider the process n1[ K1 | n2[in n3.〈in n4〉]] | n5[n4[ K2 | 〈out n5〉]] where
K1 = {n3, open n2} and K2 = {open n1}. Let the goal be that there is no
intruder process who will know both open n1 and open n2. The lazy mobile
ambient technique finds an attack as follows:
(n1[ K1 | n3[ K1 | n2[〈in n4〉]]] | n5[n4[ K2 | 〈out n5〉]], true)
⇒ (n1[ K1 | n3[ K1 | 〈in n4〉]] | n5[n4[ K2 | 〈out n5〉]], φ1) by rule (11)
⇒ (n1[ K1 | n3[ K1 ∪ {in n4} ]] | n5[n4[ K2 | 〈out n5〉]], φ1) by rule (13)
⇒ (n1[ K1 | K1 ∪ {in n4} ] | n5[n4[ K2 | 〈out n5〉]], φ2) by rule (11)
⇒ (n1[ K1 ∪ {in n4} ] | n5[n4[ K2 | 〈out n5〉]], φ2) by rule (15)
⇒ (n1[ K1 ∪ {in n4} ] | n4[ K2 ] | n5[0], φ2) by rule (2)
⇒ (n4[ K2 | n1[ K1 ∪ {in n4} ]] | n5[0], φ3) by rule (6)
⇒ (n4[ K2 | K1 ∪ {in n4} ] | n5[0], φ4) by rule (11)
⇒ (n4[ K2 ∪K1 ∪ {in n4} ] | n5[0], φ4) by rule (15)
where we the following satisfiable constraints: φ1 = K1 ` open n2, φ2 = φ1∧K1 `
open n3, φ3 = φ2∧K1∪{in m4} ` in m4, and φ4 = φ3∧K2 ` open n1. We have
reached a state where an intruder ambient knows both open n1 and open n2.
4 Conclusions
We have transferred the symbolic lazy intruder technique from protocol verifica-
tion to a different problem: an intruder who creates malicious code for execution
on some honest platform. This gives us an efficient method to check whether the
platform achieves its security goals for any intruder code, because we avoid the
naive search of the space of possible programs that the intruder can come up
with. Instead we determine this code in a demand-driven, lazy way.
Our approach is closest to a model-checking technique. In contrast to static
analysis approaches, it works without over-approximation, but requires a bound-
ing of the number of steps that honest agents can perform. The symbolic nature
however allows to work without any bound on the size of programs that the
intruder can generate. This is similar to the original use of the lazy intruder in
protocol verification [11, 12, 14, 5].
We have used a fragment of the mobile ambients calculus with communi-
cation as a small and succinct formalism to model both the platform and the
mobile code [7]. We have omitted the replication operator in order to bound hon-
est ambients (though not the intruder). We have omitted the path constraints
because they induce considerable complications for our approach and leave their
integration for future work. We also plan to consider the extension of boxed
ambients introduced by Bugliesi et al. [6] which add interesting means for access
control and communication. We also note that our method can easily support
the extension of capabilities/messages with the usual operators from (symbolic)
protocol verification like encryption and signing.
We believe that the approach we have presented here is generally applicable
to the formal analysis of platforms that host mobile code. The key elements can
be summarized as follows. First, the code can be lazily developed by exploring
at each step which operations can be performed next and what data is needed.
This data is handled lazily as well. Second, the intruder code has a notion of
knowledge that it can use in further operations and communications, and every
received message adds to this knowledge. Third, the code may be able to move to
other locations; two pieces of intruder code that meet then pool their knowledge.
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